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JUSTICE BY PAPERWORK: A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A 
COURT SCRIBE IN BOURBON MEXICO CITY 
By Michael C. Scardaville University of South Caroiina 
After recounting his seven years of loyal and unfailing service as a scribe (escrib- 
ano) in Mexico City, Mariano Espinosa proceeded to express his concerns to the 
magistrates of the Sala del Crirnen, the high criminal court ofNew Spain. In a 
1795 petition for a remunerated appointment in the Sala, he complained about 
"the onerous duties of (his current) position, working throughout the day and 
night? with an incessant and daily fatigue (and) ... a very limited income." 
Disappointed by the ministers' unwillingness to grant his request, Espinosa sub- 
mitted a second petition three years later in which he explained the physical and 
financial burdens of his job in more graphic terms. After reminding the magis? 
trates of the high court that he has been an escribano "without any salary save 
for the immense work, travails, inconveniences and miseries that the criminal 
justice system produces, which is well-known to the Ministers (of the court)," 
he then described his typical daily duties as escribano: 
from before eight until after eleven in the morning, this subordinate official is 
present to assist his magistrate with the expected respect and decorum: subse- 
quently working in the houses of the Lord Ministers, he continues dispatching 
the serious and minor criminal cases as well as the other important tasks until he 
leaves at one, two, or three o'clock in the afternoon. Without more than one or 
two hours of rest, he returns to the office of the Lord Minister to assist in con? 
tinuing the responsibilities of his occupation until the evening prayer. Afterwards 
he assists the above Ministers or their ward police officials (alcaldes de Quartel) on 
their evening patrols until ten, eleven, or twelve o'clock, since it commonly hap- 
pens that incidents of homicides, aggravated assaults, robberies, and other serious 
crimes, which one cannot avoid noticing, occur in these late hours. It happens, 
moreover, that more crimes are committed on holidays, because of the increase 
of public drunkenness, than on workdays so that the need to locate witnesses and 
undertake judicial investigations further deprives one ofthe short rest period that 
is left.1 
Shall we dismiss these comments as the kind of hyperbole that historians of 
colonial Mexico and Spanish America have come to expect in petitions to the 
government, or is there any substance to Espinosa's claims? And if indeed he did 
not exaggerate, then what do his quotidian tasks and workload tell us about the 
municipal criminal justice system, especially the nature of judicial proceedings, 
at a critical time of rapid urban growth, expanding poverty, and government and 
elite fears of social disorder and popular unrest in the capital ofthe Viceroyalty of 
New Spain? While I am not able to reconstruct Espinosa's particular work routine 
from the existing records, it is possible to assess his petitions, and ultimately the 
nature of criminal judicial procedure, by reconstructing a "typical" day in the 
life of an escribano who worked in the lower criminal courts of Mexico City in 
the decades before the outbreak ofthe tumultuous independence movement in 
1810. 
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What can we possibly learn about the local criminal justice system by examin- 
ing the work of such a low-level official ofthe court?2 Following an escribano on 
his daily rounds, I would contend, ultimately provides a means to evaluate the 
prevailing scholarly view of criminal judicial administration in Bourbon Mexico 
and the nature of the late colonial state. Generations of historians, as well as 
nineteenth-century Liberal and Positivist critics, have asserted that the Bourbon 
authorities in Mexico City and throughout the colony maintained a criminal 
justice system that was corrupt, arbitrary, abusive, and unjust, and showed little 
respect for due process of law. According to this perspective, the absolutist Bour? 
bon state embraced oppressive criminal legal practices as one of the principal 
means of controlling the popular groups, upholding public order, and ultimately 
sustaining the state's authority through coercion and fear.3 
By continuing to embrace this one-dimensional view of the Bourbon state 
and its elite allies, a view which obscures the multiple ways in which the state 
was experienced and understood, most scholars of colonial law and judicial 
administration in Mexico City tenaciously cling to what historians of early 
modern Europe have shown to be a questionable model of an absolutist state. 
In the last fifteen years, the literature on European state formation has offered a 
more complex and nuanced understanding of royal absolutism that disputes the 
conventional notion that monarchs of the ancien regime exercised absolute and, 
in some instances, despotic power. These studies illustrate that the concept and 
historiography of 'absolutism' were largely products of both royal rhetoric and 
the diatribes of nineteenth-century Liberals who denounced the earlier regimes 
as part of their ideological struggles against the post-Napoleonic conservative 
restoration monarchies. When stripped of its "mythology," the early modern 
state that emerges from this recent literature is one that generally is not despotic, 
arbitrary, or autocratic, even in the period of "Enlightened Despotism." In spite of 
the rhetoric and imagery of'absolutism,' institutional prerogatives, customs, and 
law, even criminal law, constrained state power, and the monarch was expected to 
and largely did respect the rights of his subjects. This revisionist understanding 
of the ancien regime, which is sensitive to the pre-modern balance between 
absolute and limited authority, can prove helpful in rethinking the prevailing 
notion of criminal judicial administration in Mexico City in particular and the 
late colonial state in general.4 
Another shortcoming of the dominant view of judicial and other state in? 
stitutions in colonial Mexico City is that it primarily emphasizes government 
objectives and policies, and the responses to these initiatives, while de voting 
less attention to the institutional processes and means by which such intended 
outcomes were generated, an approach that thereby ignores the crucial aspect 
of how institutions work.5 The inner and intimate workings of public institu? 
tions provide insight into issues of state power and legitimacy as well as popular 
perceptions and responses. How institutions operate, not simply what they try 
to accomplish, also shapes how they are viewed by individuals and groups of 
all social classes. While historians know much about the structure of the ex? 
panded municipal criminal justice system in Mexico City, which by the end 
of the eighteenth century processed over 10,000 cases annually, little has been 
written about how it functioned on a daily basis. This essay will emphasize that it 
is not simply in the final court decisions, but also in the everyday and mundane 
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operations of the courts, such as in the criminal procedural forms and methods 
practiced by judicial officials, that working-class people in Mexico City formed 
opinions about the fairness ofthe law, which in turn helped shape notions about 
their relationship with the multi-faceted colonial state.6 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Mexico City, the largest 
city in the Western Hemisphere at that time, experienced what Silvia Arrom 
refers to as its "first 'urban crisis'" as mounting economic difficulties confronted 
most residents of the capital.7 Life for the popular classes became more ardu- 
ous and less secure in the closing decades of colonial era. The working poor, 
a diverse group of Spanish, Indian, and casta (mixed ethnic background) arti? 
sans and day laborers who comprised roughly three-quarters of Mexico City's 
125,000-160,000 residents, suffered from a severe labor surplus, inflation, wage 
stagnation, periodic subsistence crises, and an overall decline in living standards, 
developments which were fueled by high annual urban growth rates and which 
resulted in, by all accounts, increased levels of crime. The viceregal authorities 
responded to what they perceived as an unstable and dangerous situation by 
expanding the police and local court system in the early 1780s and by relying 
on military patrols to maintain "public tranquility."8 In language that expressed 
their economic and cultural distance from members of urban popular groups, 
government officials and the city's wealthier residents publicly described the 
increasingly impoverished working poor of Mexico City in a contemptuous and 
condescending, yet always anxious manner.9 
To what extent did such fears shape the administration of criminal justice 
in the rapidly-growing metropolis? Did they ultimately lead to the arbitrary 
and abusive legal behavior that historians have claimed was the norm in the 
late colonial period? One profitable way to address these issues and assess the 
detailed operation of the local criminal justice system is to examine the duties 
of an escribano like Mariano Espinosa.10 The workhorses of the judiciary in 
Mexico City, as a close reading of criminal records will illustrate, were those 
escribanos who assisted one of the principal magistrates (jueces mayores) of the 
eight first instance tribunals or one or more of the thirty-two alcaldes de barrio 
or ward police officials. Spanish law dating back to the thirteenth-century Siete 
Partidas required scribes to be involved in every step ofthe judicial process, from 
arrest through sentencing, since all actions and activities had to be witnessed 
and recorded by the escribano in order to have legal validity.11 The magistrate 
and the scribe, both of whom were charged with ensuring that all cases were 
handled in accordance with the law and that legal guarantees were fulfilled, 
acted as the primary figures in the criminal judicial process. While the judge 
initiated the criminal proceedings, supervised the subsequent investigation, and 
issued major legal judgements, he typically delegated the investigation to his 
escribano, who in turn gathered the evidence necessary to assess the criminal 
charge.12 In the Ibero-American judicial process, the escribano, as the eyes, 
ears, and feet of the court, was the most active and involved judicial official in 
criminal proceedings.13 Not merely a court reporter, he served as the principal 
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investigator for the judge as well as the judicial officer who implemented the 
magistrate's decisions. In making certain that standard legal procedural norms 
were followed, the escribano ultimately played a significant role in determining 
the effectiveness and integrity ofthe criminal judicial system.14 In recognition 
of their crucial role, Charles III noted in 1788 that "the fair administration of 
justice ... (and) also the peace and tranquility ofthe communities ... depend in 
great part... on the dedication and impartiality ofthe Scribes."15 The escribano, 
though often absent in historians' narratives, was both the representative and 
embodiment ofthe legal culture inNew Spain, or at least in Mexico City, where 
almost two-thirds of royal escribanos in the colony resided.16 
The scribes' central role in legal cases required expertise in proper juridical 
forms and processes. How they acquired such knowledge depended on whether 
they were appointed as royal or as deputy scribes. Before receiving the title "es? 
cribano real," royal scribes, most of whom were creoles (locally-born Spaniards), 
undertook a four-year apprenticeship, studied published and manuscript legal 
handbooks and formularies, participated in workshops offered by Real CoUgio de 
Escribanos after its establishment in 1792, and passed an examination adminis- 
tered by the Audiencia, the highest colonial court in New Spain.17 As a result of 
their personal background, education, and accreditation, escribanos reales were 
considered to be legal professionals, not mere clerks (i.e. escribientes).18 
Though scribes were central to the legal process, these judicial officials were 
in short supply in Mexico City and in the colony of New Spain as a whole at 
the end of the colonial period.19 There simply were not enough royal scribes to 
fill the forty positions prescribed by the expanded local criminal justice system 
in Mexico City.20 The solution to this shortfall was twofold. In an explicit 
recognition of this problem, viceregal authorities sanctioned in 1782, originally 
as an interim measure, the appointment of escribanos habiUtados, so-called deputy 
scribes who did not have to undergo the formal training and certification process 
required of escribanos reales. Dozens of these deputized officials, who, like Mariano 
Espinosa, were overwhelmingly creole in background, were deployed soon after 
the expanded judicial system became operational.21 Since this solution still did 
not produce enough scribes to fully staff the courts and assist the police, the 
viceroys appointed escribanos, both royal and deputy, to work in more than 
one minor district.22 Some scribes served not only the magistrate of one of the 
cuarteUs mayores, but also the four alcaldes de barrio who served in the precincts 
of that district.23 
As a result of the pivotal role that escribanos played in the Ibero-American 
legal system, their presence in the expanded criminal justice system was manda- 
tory, even if the viceregal authorities relied on deputy scribes to ensure com- 
pliance with legal norms and expectations.24 Although personal integrity and 
intellectual capability were the only specified qualifications necessary to serve 
as escribanos habiUtados, the men named to these positions tended to have some 
legal experience prior to their appointment and had ready access to the same 
legal handbooks and formularies that helped train the royal scribes.25 Further, 
the escribanos habiUtados, like the escribanos reales, generally served for many 
years, thereby acquiring substantial professional experience over time.26 In spite 
of occasional protests from the Rector of the Real CoUgio de Escribanos over the 
continued use ofthe deputy scribes, the local magistrates, including those jurists 
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who served as judges on the Sala del Crimen, praised the quality of their work. As 
cogent testimony to their more than acceptable performance, one of these high 
court magistrates, Manuel del Campo y Rivas, informed the viceroy in 1809 that 
he believed Mariano Uruena, the deputy scribe who assisted him and the four 
akaldes de barrio in his district, had been trained at the Real Colegio de Escribanos 
and had passed the exam supervised by the Audiencia.21 
Because of their experience and background in procedural law as well as their 
centrality in criminal proceedings, escribanos acted as legal advisors to the three 
municipal lay magistrates and the thirty-two akaldes de barrio, judicial personnel 
who had no prior legal training.28 On a daily and recurring basis, the escribanos 
were a font of reliable knowledge about proper legal procedures from arrest to final 
sentencing, information that was particularly critical given the vast, complex, 
and sometimes contradictory nature of Spanish colonial law.29 Their advisory 
function was especially valuable considering the high rate of turnover in law 
enforcement and judicial positions and the demanding administrative duties of 
all the magistrates and ward police.30 Scribes provided for legal continuity in the 
courts ofthe municipal judges and in the neighborhood districts ofthe akaldes de 
barrio?1 They ensured that in the daily administration of justice, lay magistrates 
and other judicial figures correctly followed procedural forms at each step in 
the criminal case. Particularly at the lower levels of the municipal criminal 
justice system, the escribano's knowledge of the legal process was essential for a 
smooth-running and legally-constituted judicial system.32 
Given the importance of historicizing and contextuaiizing the daily operation 
ofthe criminal justice system, that is, to understand notions of law in a particular 
place and time, it is imperative to discuss the work routine ofthe court scribes and 
assess the administration of criminal justice on the basis ofthe extensive case file 
evidence, not, as has often been the case, on the second-hand comments of late 
colonial observers. Consequently, the following account of the judicial system 
and its officials is grounded largely on an analysis of almost 7,400 criminal cases 
processed in the lower courts of the viceregal capital between the early 1780s 
andl810.33 
The average daily caseload for each scribe ranged from at least one to as many 
as ten, or twelve, or in some instances, fifteen.34 The number of criminal cases 
varied as a result of several factors. The viceroy could appoint escribanos to assist 
from one to as many as five judicial officials.35 The caseload also depended on 
the level of criminal activity and the resulting police work as well as the number 
of criminal charges filed by residents of the city. Weekends and religious holi? 
days placed greater demands on all local judicial officials, particularly because 
of an extraordinary increase in the incidence of drink-related offenses. Finally, 
the workload of the escribanos related to the manner in which the magistrates 
handled the criminal cases. Depending on the gravity of the offense, the eight 
lower courts of Mexico City adjudicated criminal cases through either a jukio 
sumario or ajuicio ordinario. More than nine of every ten criminal cases were 
processed as juicios sumarios, that is, summary or abbreviated proceedings for 
minor offenses in which the magistrates issued a sentence after preliminary tes? 
timony had been given and, if necessary, additional fact-finding investigations 
had been conducted.37 The more serious offenses, which necessitated more ex? 
tensive judicial activities, became the juicios ordinarios, time-consuming cases 
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that involved a more prolonged investigative phase before the magistrate issued 
a final sentence.38 With these variables in mind, we should remember that the 
many cases comprising the escribano's daily work routine fell into different stages 
ofthe criminal judicial process, from initial processing to judicial investigation, 
and ultimately to final sentencing. 
What becomes notable upon reading many juicios is the routine, almost formu- 
laic nature of criminal proceedings. While the predictability of legal procedure 
is observed again and again in the summary and more formal cases, I suggest 
that we do not ascertain the intimate workings of the criminal justice system, 
or its underlying principles, until we examine how it functioned in the course 
of a "typical" day. A description of one or several cases does not illustrate the 
daily workload and the professional commitment of an escribano. A better sense 
of judicial administration emerges when individual cases are placed within the 
larger context of an entire workday.39 
The following composite picture of a representative day in the life of a scribe 
in Bourbon Mexico City will focus on his standard work practices, not on the 
anomalies that historians and penal critics have tended to portray as the juridical 
norm.40 The day for an escribano customarily began between 7:00-8:00 in the 
morning in one of the local jails where he reviewed the Libro de entradas (Book 
of Admissions) for prisoners who had been arrested on the previous day by order 
of his magistrate or by his alcalde de barrio.4'1 After he recorded the particulars for 
each prisoner, such as the name, other biographical information, the arresting 
officer, and the nature of the offense, he proceeded, as was required by law, to 
take brief statements from each of the accused in the jail's sala de declaraciones 
(statement room) in order to document the reasons for their imprisonment and 
the circumstances behind the criminal charges.42 The escribano then returned 
to his office where he noted this information in abbreviated form in an arrest 
inventory he maintained, the Libro de reos, and prepared in writing a brief 
account (certificacion) of each of the new cases for the magistrate. Armed with 
the inventory and the certificaciones, as well as any of the files of the juicios 
ordinarios that were in need of court review, he then headed off to the office 
or home of the judge to personally deliver and, if necessary, explain this latest 
batch of judicial records.43 
The judge began this meeting with his escribano by reviewing the new cases. If 
the offense was minor and the preliminary testimonies substantiated or refuted 
the charges, the magistrate, depending on the nature of the offense and the 
evidence, either pronounced the sentence or authorized additional legal proce? 
dures such as the submission ofa medical report on the victim (fe de heridas), the 
preparation ofa character investigation (averiguacion de vida y costumbres), or the 
recording of testimony from the aggrieved party, eyewitnesses, and/or police of? 
ficials. If preliminary evidence underscored the gravity ofthe offense or, in cases 
of aggravated assault, if the victim's life were in danger, the magistrate authorized 
the commencement ofa more formal juicio ordinario, an injunction that typically 
outlined the nature of the subsequent investigation required of the scribe. For 
the juicios sumarios, the escribano dutifully recorded the judge's decrees (autos) 
in the arrest inventory. For the more formal juicios ordinarios, the scribe opened 
a new criminal file by transcribing the order dictated by the judge (auto cabeza 
del proceso) that initiated the sumaria, the first or probatory phase ofthe case. At 
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this point, the magistrate turned his attention to the outstanding criminal files, 
reading the most current testimonies and the results of other judicial actions 
before issuing a sentence or ordering the escribano to undertake more inquiries 
or perform some other appropriate court action. After recording this batch of 
decrees in the files, the scribe gathered his documents and returned to his office 
to plan and coordinate his court-ordered responsibilities for the remainder of 
the day. 
The case evidence suggests that the next portion of the day began with our 
escribano returning to the jail to notify the prisoners and the jailer, in writing 
and orally, of the judge's sentences, pronouncements that had to be signed or 
certified by all parties in front ofthe scribe.44 Upon leaving the jail, the escribano 
most likely turned his attention to the latest round of testimonies required by 
the judge. Taking statements generally consumed considerable time, especially 
since there was no one central location where these declarations were recorded. 
While he could take additional testimony from a prisoner before leaving the 
jail or find an assault victim in one of the hospitals, our escribano was forced 
to scurry all over the sprawling city to track down and take statements from 
eyewitnesses and police officials. Unquestionably, most demanding of his time 
were cases involving multiple prisoners and/or many witnesses. 
Other standard judicial procedures performed by the scribe on any given day 
might include: recording and collecting medical reports from royal physicians; 
delivering criminal files to the asesor ktrado or the magistrate of another criminal 
jurisdiction in the city; informing all parties involved in a case ofthe court's ma? 
jor rulings; arranging and conducting a careo (a face-to-face encounter between 
the accused and other parties and witnesses) in order to reconcile conflicting 
testimony; and implementing the provisions of the judge's sentence, such as 
sending a young boy to a workshop to learn a trade or making necessary arrange? 
ments for placing a woman in a deposito or casa de honra (forms of supervisory 
custody). 
The escribano also had to find time during the day to manage his judicial 
books and files. He had to maintain and update all criminal records, such as 
the Libro de reos, the outstanding juicios ordinarios as well as a series of ledgers 
(Libros de conocimientos) of these materials,45 and the Sala del Crimen required 
him to prepare bi-weekly status reports of the formal criminal cases for which 
he was responsible. In addition, he attended to the many details of managing 
the individual case files, such as retrieving and filing any relevant materials, 
archiving completed files, and appending documents submitted by physicians, 
family members, and the prisoner. These daily routines could always be disrupted 
at any time if a crime were reported to his akalde de barrio or juez mayor since, 
as stipulated by law, any arrest made after an accusation had been filed had to 
be properly recorded in the presence of an escribano.*6 Such disruptions were a 
common occurrence since members of the popular classes of Mexico City filed 
thousands of such criminal complaints annually.47 
The early evening hours brought little respite from the day's activities. A num? 
ber of tasks required attention, such as implementing unfinished judicial orders, 
updating and delivering criminal files, and recording testimonies from witnesses 
who had not been located earlier that day. Finally, the escribano accompanied his 
judge or akalde de barrio on the evening neighborhood patrols (rondas), where in 
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the course of recording any arrests and other judicial actions they occasionally 
were exposed to iife-threatening situations.48 These rondas generally began at 
8:00 PM and sometimes were conducted on the hour until midnight or 1:00 
AM. 
While the above narrative describes a representative day for our archetypal 
escribano, we must remember that he was expected to perform these responsi? 
bilities for 14 to 18 hours daily, seven days a week, 365 days a year, with an 
increased workload on weekends and holidays.49 Moreover, in addition to this 
daily routine, he also discharged additional judicial responsibilities as the need 
arose. In 1787, for instance, the Sala del Crimen required all escribanos with active 
cases to participate in the weekly Saturday morning inspections of the city and 
royal jails.50 In addition, the magistrate or akalde de barrio at times mandated 
special judicial actions of their scribes such as furnishing drawings of weapons 
and other evidence, summarizing complex and lengthy files, and accompanying 
a police official to examine a corpse in the middle of the night.51 Particularly 
time-consuming were the procedural actions required during any of the peri- 
odic Uvas de vagos (forced levies of alleged vagrants) or in implementing the 
occasional royal pardon.52 
In addition to his regular and intermittent judicial responsibilities, the es? 
cribano also had to fulfill exacting administrative obligations, especially those 
relating to municipal administration, or PoUcia, which spawned reams of paper- 
work. In a governmental system that did not separate administrative and judicial 
functions, the magistrates and their alcaldes de barrio, in addition to their crimi? 
nal law duties, were responsible for enforcing a myriad of edicts that attempted to 
regulate garbage collection, street paving and lighting, liquor violations, build? 
ing codes, and animal control.53 The escribanos of these officials recorded and 
delivered the innumerable reports, some of them submitted weekly, that touched 
on local administrative matters.54 
Finally, on top of their criminal and administrative charges, some ofthe scribes 
also possessed varying degrees of responsibilities in the preparation of civil law- 
suits and notary records. Unlike the escribanos de cdmara, the institutionally- 
based scribes who assisted the ministers of the Sala del Crimen, the escribanos 
of the municipal lay magistrates and the alcaldes de barrio maintained their own 
offices which, depending on their level of involvement in litigation and notary 
records, might be staffed with clerks and perhaps an apprentice.55 
Even though the escribanos performed a remarkable amount of work on a 
recurring basis, we should not conclude as a matter of course that their seem- 
ingly excessive duties compromised the speed or quality ofthe criminal judicial 
process. Not seen in this daily snapshot is the expeditious nature of court ac? 
tivities. In the juicios sumarios, three of four people arrested were sentenced on 
the following day, with 90 percent of all the accused receiving their final court 
decisions within three days after incarceration. Even in the more procedurally 
involved juicios ordinarios, the average length of time from arrest to sentence was 
slightly less than two months.56 Moreover, the case evidence strongly suggests 
that the extensive responsibilities ofthe escribanos and the expeditious nature of 
judicial process did not generally undermine their effort to "get at the facts" of 
the case. Time and time again, as seen in thousands of cases, the scribes recorded 
the testimonies the judges ordered and, on many occasions, decided on their 
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own if additional statements or other judicial procedures, such as a careo, were 
necessary to uncover and reconcile relevant information about the case.57 
What might we learn about the criminal justice system in late Bourbon Mexico 
City from this intimate study of one of its judicial officials? What is striking at 
first giance is that the colonial legal system adhered to centuries-old standards 
of Spanish judicial procedure, in spite of the heavy caseload that fell on the 
shoulders ofthe understaffed courts and its overworked escribanos and in spite of 
publicly-expressed elite and government fears regarding the behavior of urban 
popular groups. Central to criminal proceedings, even in the overextended lower 
courts of rapidly-growing Mexico City, was the requirement that the accused 
must be allowed to defend themselves and that the magistrates must substantiate 
the charges before any punitive sentence could be imposed. Charles IV reiterated 
this fundamental juridical principle in a 1796 royal decree outlining proper 
criminal judicial procedure for cases involving resisting arrest: "I hereby declare 
and order that the Courts, using those judicial proofs that are established by 
the Law, henceforth shall not issue the sentences ... without beforehand legally 
proving the crime and (the guilt of) the criminals-(I also order) that under no 
circumstances shall the testimony of the prisoner or the prisoners not be taken 
and their exceptions and defenses not be heard since it is through such measures 
that the Courts can proceed in their cases and render their decisions with careful 
and prudent deliberation, without the danger of oppressing the innocent, which is 
one ofthe commendabk objectives in the administration of justice."58 (Italics mine) 
While Spanish colonial criminal law, like all penal codes, was designed to 
protect and bolster existing power relations and social inequalities, it also pro? 
vided for certain procedural safeguards for all subjects involved in criminal 
proceedings.59 As seen in thousands of summary and formal criminal cases, 
judicial procedure, in its various forms, was customarily followed in the lower 
courts of Mexico City, despite the burgeoning caseload, staffing concerns, and 
growing fear of crime and other forms of social disorder. 
Legal safeguards were repeatedly honored in the daily administration of crim? 
inal justice in late colonial Mexico City because ofa shared understanding that 
state authority was based, in part, on the functioning of public institutions in 
ways that had become culturally expected by all social groups. The expectations 
of "justicia," which were frequently articulated in testimonies and criminal ac? 
cusations of working-class people in Mexico City, were based on a widely-held 
notion of fairness, that is, the belief that the king and his agents would adhere 
to basic legal guarantees in a timely manner, and, as a result, would not treat 
his subjects in arbitrary, abusive, and unpredictable ways.60 The extent to which 
the criminal justice system routinely performed in culturally familiar ways in? 
fluenced how popular groups assessed the fairness and hence the legitimacy of 
judicial institutions.61 The daily operation ofthe criminal justice system, as em? 
bodied in part in the procedural work ofthe escribano who regularly upheld legal 
and cultural norms, shaped popular notions of the state and thereby became 
one ofthe means through which public authority was sustained in late Bourbon 
Mexico City.62 
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While the everyday practices ofthe court, as partially seen in the work routine 
of the scribe, tempered arbitrary justice and largely met popular expectations, 
there was, nonetheless, room for possible abuses and problems. Let me briefly 
address the extent to which corruption and inefficiency might have undermined 
the operation and hence credibility of criminal judicial institutions in Mexico 
City. The traditional fee-based system of remuneration for scribes offered the 
potential for extortion, but I contend that this method of compensation for 
judicial services did not create major problems for most working-class people 
who came into contact with the criminal legal system. Careful reading ofthe case 
evidence, against the backdrop of established and expected procedural norms, 
does not suggest that charging excessive and unnecessary fees was a common 
problem in the criminal proceedings of the city's lower courts.63 If financial 
considerations solely or largely motivated the daily behavior of scribes and other 
judicial officials, one would assume that, because of the additional fee-based 
procedural actions required in the formal criminal cases, more juicios ordinarios, 
and fewer summary cases, would have been authorized, but, as seen repeatedly 
in the case files, the decision to handle a case as a sumario or an ordinario was 
based on the gravity of the offense, not on the potential for generating fees for 
the scribe and other court officials. Another possible financial abuse was that in 
the juicios ordinarios, the judge, as advised by his escribano, could have mandated 
more fee-based judicial actions. What typically occurred in the more formal 
cases, however, was that the magistrate, if fully convinced ofthe culpability of 
the accused, terminated the case upon completion of the investigative phase 
(sumaria), thereby avoiding the redundant and often dispensable pUnario phase, 
a more time-consuming and expensive part of the trial in which the parties 
offered a complex series of judicial proofs.64 
There is little evidence to suggest that the scribes unnecessarily prolonged 
their judicial activities in spite of a fee structure that in principle would have 
financially rewarded such behavior. For instance, for conducting a careo, the 
arancel (sanctioned fee list) authorized the escribanos to collect one peso from 
each prisoner who participated in this judicial confrontation.65 Given the fact 
that the magistrate typically gave his scribe discretion to call for this procedu? 
ral action, the escribano could have easily abused his authority by authorizing 
numerous careos, but the only time they appear in the records was when the 
scribe wished to resolve major discrepancies in the testimonies before the judge 
issued the final sentence. In all, the magistrates and escribanos typically did not 
call for unnecessary judicial procedures to increase the total amount of fees the 
scribe could collect. These judicial officials typically undertook the necessary, 
but minimal steps in their handling ofthe criminal cases. Ultimately, we should 
bear in mind that the judges, in accordance with royal legislation, often waived 
the payment of scribe fees for indigents, a decision that not only lessened the 
financial burdens of criminal justice on the poor, but also provided an incentive 
to expedite the criminal proceedings.66 
The potential for monetary abuses was far greater in the civil lawsuits pro- 
cessed in Mexico City. Not only did the parties embroiled in litigation generally 
have more financial resources than those who became involved in the criminal 
judiciary, the evidence also suggests that escribanos reales and lawyers in civil 
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cases prolonged proceedings on many occasions if it were in the interests of 
their clients, and themselves, to delay.67 While some criminal cases surely were 
affected by financial abuses, they simply did not offer the potential for mone- 
tary gain that the civil cases did.68 The more lucrative civil law practices of the 
scribes tended to make the daily operation of the criminal judicial system more 
honest.69 
Chronic delays in the handling of criminal cases might have compromised 
the expectations of justice, but very few cases were excessively drawn out. Once 
again, the case file evidence provides insight into the relatively few protracted 
proceedings. In general, procedural delays were not the result of negligence and 
mismanagement on the part of court personnel, although in some instances an 
overworked and understaffed bureaucracy misplaced criminal files, which did 
postpone the implementation of judicial actions and prolong incarceration.70 
Delays were much more likely a result of other factors. A magistrate could have 
ordered additional procedural steps if he were not convinced he had all the 
information necessary to issue an appropriate sentence; or the case involved 
another criminal jurisdiction in the city, which consequently necessitated ad? 
ditional judicial actions; or the aggrieved parties dragged their feet in order to 
keep the accused from leaving jail; or the court was waiting for an assault victim 
to recover from injuries before passing sentence.71 
This understanding and portrayal ofthe criminal justice system of late colonial 
Mexico City does not seek to deny that law can be coercive and that power is 
embedded in court procedures.72 Criminal law can and does impose rules and 
punishments, and its power also can be expressed in the manner in which the 
judicial process shapes experiences and meanings. The key is in how that power 
is expressed, and as is seen through the daily activities ofthe escribano, the courts 
did not withhold legal guarantees and ultimately issue arbitrary and unduly harsh 
sentences.73 
But why was this so, particularly at a time of rapid urban change, increasing 
crime, and resulting elite and government concerns? Why did the escribanos of 
late Bourbon Mexico City continue, day-in and day-out, to take testimonies 
and resolve discrepancies, in even the most minor of offenses, and why did the 
local magistrates continue to base their sentences on the evidence gathered 
in these judicial investigations? What ensured routine adherence to judicial 
procedure, and thereby minimized the possibility of politicizing criminal justice, 
was the continued and systematic application ofthe medieval juridical doctrine 
of arbitrio judicial.? This concept, best understood as judicial will or discretion, 
simply meant that the magistrate could modify the legally-prescribed sentence 
in order to render a judgment that sought equidad (equity) and maximized the 
common good. As noted in the legal codes, a just and proper sentence had to 
be based on evidence, the circumstances of the crime, and the background of 
the accused, information the escribano collected in the probatory phase of the 
case. Before issuing sentence, the judge assessed such factors as criminal intent, 
motive, severity and place of crime, as well as the economic and ethnic status 
ofthe accused. The ultimate objective, as stipulated by law and practiced in the 
courts of colonial Mexico City, was that a magistrate would pronounce a sentence 
that was proportionate to the crime and therefore tailored to the particular case, 
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even if it meant that his decree modified the penalties specified in the laws. 
This judicial flexibility, as evidenced by the routine evoking of arbitrio judicial, 
depended on the standard and uniform application of judicial procedure. 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century penal reformers and theorists as well 
as many historians of crime and Ibero-American law have mistakenly regarded 
arbitrio judicial as another example of an abusive and capricious absolutist state.75 
The potential for abuses clearly existed, since the magistrates, in accordance with 
their personal preferences and impulses, could have decided to issue sentences 
without undertaking the necessary probatory measures. However, examination 
of thousands of criminal records from late colonial Mexico City unearths little 
evidence of such legal misconduct. Judicial process was followed, sentences were 
moderate and proportionate to the offense, and the judges as a matter of course 
released the accused if there was insufficient evidence. Understood in the context 
of Ibero-American legal traditions, the concept of arbitrio judicial represented not 
so much a corruption of justice, as is typically portrayed in the literature, but 
rather an opportunity to shape the law to reflect, or at least strike some balance 
between, popular and elite expectations.76 
The practice of arbitrio judicial had political repercussions that have not been 
addressed in the historical literature, but are relevant to the issues raised in this 
essay. The principle of judicial discretion, with origins in medieval Natural Law, 
enabled both the superior and the inferior magistrates in Mexico City to main? 
tain some distance from the wishes and intent of the colonial Bourbon state. 
While judges and other judicial officials were, indeed, representatives ofthe gov? 
ernment, they often acted independently ofthe state.77 The legally-constituted 
authority to modify existing laws to fit the circumstances of the crime and to 
issue sentences that reflected what they believed were just and proper afforded 
a degree of autonomy to magistrates. Although such autonomy cushioned the 
full impact of state power, the Bourbons, even when they repeatedly called for 
adherence to sentences specified in the laws, ultimately did not tamper with 
the relative independence of the judges. Moreover, the growing fears of urban 
disorder, combined with an overextended and understaffed local court system, 
could have enticed the magistrates to neglect extensive judicial investigations 
and simply issue arbitrary and harsh sentences, but, as we have seen, they did 
not. This judicial and political behavior, both in the criminal courts as well as in 
the offices of the Bourbon policy makers, reflects the respect for and adherence 
to a deeply-entrenched legal culture in late colonial Mexico City. 
To fully comprehend the nature ofthe criminal justice system in Mexico City 
is to understand that the judicial power ofthe colonial state and its agents was not 
to be found in the trappings, rituals, and royal regalia ofthe court/8 As seen in 
the daily activities of an escribano, there were no courtroom trials in the Ibero- 
American legal tradition, a judicial style that, unlike its eighteenth-century 
English counterpart, was not publicly magisterial. The so-called criminal "trial" 
in the Spanish colonial legal system was more ofa dispersed, bureaucratic inves? 
tigation, which culminated in a final judicial ruling. There were no formal court 
hearings in late colonial Mexico City, but the escribano recorded testimony and 
performed other judicial actions, ultimately delivering a complete investigative 
report or dossier to the magistrate to read before he issued the final sentence.79 
The judge rarely saw the accused, not even to pronounce the sentence and issue 
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the usual admonition, but he did meet with his escribano every day to ensure 
that the proper and expected legal actions were being undertaken.80 
It was justice by paperwork, with the escribano, as an intermediary between 
state and society, involved in every step.81 In fulfilling his procedural responsi? 
bilities, the scribe functioned as one of the many lesser royal officials through 
whom Spanish power was expressed and its authority conditionally assured.82 
By generally adhering to cultural expectations ofthe law, as expressed in routine 
and quotidian court procedures and outcomes, the principal court officials, the 
magistrate and the escribano, helped to foster and sustain legitimacy for judicial 
institutions in late colonial Mexico City.83 
Let us now return to Mariano Espinosa's petitions and briefly re-examine 
them within a broader understanding of the customary responsibilities of the 
escribanos. The evidence suggests that Espinosa was not exaggerating his claims 
and that he was, indeed, an overworked official in an understaffed judiciary. The 
meager income he earned for the demanding and sometimes dangerous criminal 
judicial work motivated Espinosa to seek salaried employment in the viceregal 
bureaucracy, which he finally secured by 1806 when we find him in a low-level 
legal position in the Sala del Crimen.8* 
As seen in the criminal procedures performed day after day by Espinosa and 
other escribanos, late colonial royal and municipal officials, in an era of expanding 
urban poverty, growing fear of crime and a concomitant enhancement of public 
security measures, did not exercise judicial power in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner.85 Such legal behavior fostered, I would suggest, a widespread acceptance 
ofthe legitimacy of criminal judicial institutions in Mexico City, an acceptance 
based in part on the court's adherence to expectations of procedural fairness and 
as evidenced by the thousands of poor people from diverse backgrounds who 
voluntarily went to the courts each year as a means of seeking "justicia," righting 
wrongs, and pursuing various strategic objectives.86 This is not to say that force 
was absent in the criminal justice system, but coercion is best understood as 
part of a wider array of other, less harsh methods of securing social cooperation. 
Contrary to what others have claimed about the colonial system of criminal 
justice, the Bourbons did not rule in Mexico City largely through fear.87 
While this essay does not address other regions of New Spain or earlier pe? 
riods in Mexico City, the procedural case evidence suggests that fundamental 
juridical elements of the medieval and early modern Hapsburg states endured 
in Mexico City toward the end of Bourbon rule.88 Late colonial royal policy 
makers unquestionably attempted to rationalize and centralize government in? 
stitutions, but they did not challenge traditional, pre-Enlightenment juridical 
principles, principles that, as the literature on European state formation also has 
demonstrated, checked unbridled royal power and worked to limit the authority 
of the "absolutist" Bourbon state. 
By continuing to provide a predictable, flexible, and procedurally fair legal 
order, the Bourbons understood the role that law plays in sustaining author? 
ity. Like their Hapsburg predecessors, they clearly associated notions of good 
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government and the maintenance of political order with proper administration 
of justice.89 In fact, beginning in the 1750s and continuing for the next four 
decades, Bourbon authorities on both sides ofthe Atlantic implemented a series 
of measures to improve the quality of justice, especially in procedural matters, 
measures that upheld and reinforced traditional Iberian juridical principles, such 
as arbitrio judicial.90 The Bourbons most certainly sought public order in an era 
characterized by change and anxiety, yet, when we explore the innermost work- 
ings of criminal judicial institutions in Mexico City, it becomes clear that they 
did not seek order at any price.91 
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law, the 1782 Ordinance explicitly excluded deputy scribes from participating in civil 
litigation and notarial transactions. 
22. Assignment to more than one cuartel menor was so common that the printed ap? 
pointment form used the plural form ("menores") for the minor districts. See, for instance, 
the documents submitted by Mariano Espinosa in his 1795 petition, AGN, Criminal, vol. 
625, exp. 7. It appears, however, that the viceroy commissioned first-time deputy scribes 
to assist in only one ofthe minor districts. They would be assigned to additional districts 
after acquiring several years of experience. 
23. The most common patterns in multiple district appointment, as seen in the career 
paths of Juan Vargas and Ignacio Ramirez de Arellano, was to assist two to four of the 
alcaldes de barrio or, as in the case of Julian Roldan, work an institutional scribe in the 
Sala del Crimen and serve at least one ofthe local police officials. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, 
exps. 3 and 4. For additional examples of viceregal appointments ofescribanos habiUtados, 
see AGN, Ayuntamientos, vol. 211, exp. 9 and AGN, Escribanos, vol. 21, exp. 57. 
24. As Chandler and Burkholder note, the Spanish crown successfully reduced creole 
participation in high-ranking Audkncia positions by the end the eighteenth century, yet 
as this examination of scribes in Mexico City illustrates, locally-born Spaniards comprised 
the majority of these low-level court officials. The expanded criminal justice system and 
the importance of the scribes in this system gave creoles an opportunity to actively 
participate and shape local and viceregal judicial institutions. I would not go as far as 
to suggest that the expanded judiciary enabled creoles to resist peninsular takeover of 
royal government in late colonial period, but I believe it would be safe to say that it gave 
a heretofore unrecognized voice to some moderately educated, middle-class creoles at 
time of peninsular appropriation of government institutions. D.S. Chandler and Mark A. 
Burkholder, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 
1687-1808 (Columbia, 1977). I wish to thank Linda Arnold for providing me with 
personal information on the scribes from her unpublished collection of biographical data 
of late colonial royal bureaucrats who served in Mexico City. 
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25. There was a long tradition in the Iberian world of providing practical manuals and 
guides for scribes and lay magistrates. These legal texts and formularies, which spelled 
out judicial procedure and discussed matters of criminal and civil law in a simple manner, 
were available in cities and larger provincial communities in New Spain in the eighteenth 
century. Examples of such materials include Formulario de causas criminaks (Mexico City, 
1751), Libro de ks principaks rudimentos tocante a todos juicios, criminal, civil y executivo. 
(Mexico City, 1764), and the two volume work by Joseph Juan y Colon, Instruccion de 
Escribanos en Orden a k Judicial (Madrid, 1787), the second volume of which focused on 
"juridical instructions" to scribes, lawyers, and magistrates of the lower courts. Susana 
Garcfa Le6n, ed., "Un formulario de causas criminales de la Nueva Espana," Anuario 
Mexkano de Historia del Derecho 9 (1997): 83-148; Charles R. Cutter, ed., Libro de ks 
principaks rudimentos (Mexico City, 1994). 
26. Espinosa, for instance, ultimately worked as a scribe in Mexico City for over three 
decades (1788-1820). Among the many escribanos who served local judicial officials 
for extended periods of time are Rafael Cartami (1787-1828), Mariano Uruena (1803- 
1820), and Rafael Castro (1797-1814). AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 7; AGN, Civil, 
vol. 2156, exps. 3 and 4; Linda Arnold, Directorio de burocratas en k ciudad de Mexico, 
1761-1832 (Mexico City, 1980), 39, 63, 89, 277-278. 
2 7. The magistrate offered these positive assessments as part of an 1809 investigation into 
the alleged abuses in the appointment of escribanos habuitados. The inquiry commenced 
when the senior local magistrate, Francisco Arcipreste, contended that an unspecified 
number ofthe deputy scribes did not have what he deemed to be proper titles of appoint? 
ment. He expressed concern that some of these escribanos might have exercised their 
duties even though they were never issued formal printed titles of their appointment, 
that sometimes more than one had been appointed to serve in the same district, and fi? 
nally that some also may have continued to serve after their term had expired. Arcipreste 
persuaded Viceroy Francisco Javier de Lizana y Beaumont that it was time to investigate 
and remedy these alleged abuses as well as explore the possibility of using only formally 
trained escribanos reaks in all the minor districts of the capital. The Viceroy ordered the 
jueces mayores to review the status, appointments, and, additionally, the personal and 
professional conduct of the deputy scribes. The resulting investigations uncovered only 
one improper title of appointment, and they did not expose any inappropriate or unsat- 
isfactory conduct of the escribanos habilitados. All but one of the magistrates, the senior 
lay city magistrate who lodged the complaint, praised the quality of their work in spite 
of their many duties and overall workload. Although Arcipreste presented no proof of 
unsatisfactory professional conduct on the part of any deputy scribe in his jurisdiction, 
which he surely would have done if it had been existed, he nonetheless conjectured that 
scribes trained in the Real Cokgio de Escribanos would have performed better. It is impor? 
tant to note that the sole dissenting judge was not a ktrado while those magistrates who 
uniformly and enthusiastically commended their deputy scribes, the akaldes del crimen, 
were professionally-trained jurists. 
In an effort to protect and promote the prerogatives of their institution and its per? 
sonnel, the board members of the Real Colegio de Escribanos nonetheless asked Viceroy 
Lizana to annul the appointments of the deputy scribes, most of whom, they asserted, 
were of questionable quality and character, and appoint instead escribanos reaks who had 
been educated at the Cokgio and examined by the Audiencia. However, the governing 
board, like akalde Arcipreste, was not able to specify abuses on the part of any specific 
escribano habilitado, either presently or since they were initially used in the early 1780s. 
The board members resorted to generalities and character assassination of the deputy 
scribes, claiming at one point that half of them, as a result of their "vices and bad con? 
duct," "had prostituted themselves." The general tenor of the board's comments reflected 
frustration that viceregal and local officials did not adhere to the standard procedure for 
the appointment of royal scribes and relied instead on a clause in the 1782 Ordinance that 
allowed the viceroy to by-pass the Cokgio and the Audiencia and deputized individuals 
who had been recommended by the city's magistrates. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exps. 3 
and 4. 
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28. The three municipal-level magistrates, the two alcaldes ordinarios and the corregji- 
dor, did not possess any formal legal education and therefore, as required by law, were 
assisted by a legal advisor (asesor letrado), a lawyer or jurist who reviewed and approved 
all court sentences and other major judicial oraers issued by the lay judges. See, for in? 
stance, Archivo Judicial del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal, Mexico 
City (hereafter AJT), Penal, vol. 6, exp. 47; Borah, Justice by Insurance, 96-97. The 
unremunerated position of alcalde de barrio was filled with private citizens, mainly petty 
proprietors, the magistrates nominated and the viceroy appointed because of their local 
standing and reputation, not because of any professional expertise. In accordance with 
Spanish political philosophy and legal texts, appointment or election to judicial posts 
depended more on character, integrity, and judgement than on command of juridical 
knowledge. See Partida 3, titulo IV, ley 3 of the Siete Partidas; Ricardo Zorraquin Becu, 
La funcion de justicia en el derecho indiano (Buenos Aires, 1948), 31-33. See note 33 for 
comments about citing materials in the AJT 
29. For instance, the alcaldes de barrios, who, as jueces originarios, had the limited au? 
thority to instigate criminal proceedings before turning the case over to their juez mayor 
for final sentencing, did not enjoy the services of an asesor Utrado and therefore had to 
rely extensively on their scribe's knowledge of the penal process. For an example, see 
AJT, Penal, vol. 9, exp. 5. Through their advice to the lay magistrates and the alcaldes de 
barrio on points of substantive and procedural law, the escribanos made colonial law more 
understandable and made certain that the judicial officials adhered to procedural norms 
and processes. 
30. The akaldes de barrio and the alcaldes ordinarios typically served for a two-year period. 
Periodically, moreover, the senior alcalde ordinario jointly held the position of corregjdor, 
which meant that he was the juez mayor of the tribunals of the sixth and seventh major 
districts as well as the magistrate of the very active Tribunal del Alurnbrado, the court 
of the street lighting guards. AGN, Ayuntamientos, vol. 177, exp. 9. Also see Lozano 
Armendares, La criminalidad en la ciudad de Mexico, 19. 
31. The viceroy appointed the escribanos for a period of two years, although they generally 
were re-appointed if they had performed satisfactorily. See AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 
32. The legal expertise of escribanos who worked for one of the five alcaldes del crimen, 
all of whom were highly-educated jurists, was obviously not as critical as it was for 
the three lay magistrates and the alcaldes de barrio. For the advisory role that scribes 
performed in early colonial Mexico City and elsewhere in Spanish colonial America, see 
Mijares Ramirez, Escribanos y escrituras publicas en el sigjo XVI, 46; Jorge Lujan Mufioz, Los 
escribanos en las Indias OcciaentaUs, y en particular en el Reino de Guatemala (Guatemala, 
1977), 71-72; Tamar Herzog, MeaHacion, archivos y ejercicio: Los escribanos de Quito (siglo 
XVII) (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 29-32. 
33. In descending order of occurrence, the most frequent criminal charges involved 
drink-related offenses, common-law marriage/adultery, theft, sexual misconduct, assault, 
and illegal gambling. More than nine of ten arrests involved members of the working 
poor and involved a cross-section of this group in terms of ethnicity, although Indians 
(38%), males (74%), and artisans (50%) were over-represented in the court cases. We 
should not disregard the fact that women and lower-class creoles respectively comprised 
26% and 41% ofthe arrests. Michael C. Scardaville, "Crime and the Urban Poor: Mexico 
City in the Late Colonial Period" (Ph.D. diss. Gainesville, 1977), 34-47. 
Ofthe criminal cases analyzed, 7,067 came from ten extant arrest and court inventories 
(Libros de reos) formerly located in two municipal judicial archives in Mexico City, the 
Archivo Judicial del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal and the Archivo 
General del Juzgado, Mexico City (hereafter AGJ). Since I first consulted the documents 
in the AGJ, however, the historical records were misplaced during a renovation of the 
building. The pre-1950 documents of the AJT were recently moved to the Mexican 
JUSTICE BY PAPERWORK 999 
national archives, the Archivo General de la Nacion, but are still being catalogued. 
Since these materials have not yet been completely indexed, I continue to cite them 
in accordance with their former provenance. The remaining 296 cases analyzed for this 
essay consisted of full-length, formal criminal cases (causas criminaks) located in the 
collection of the Archivo Judicial del Tribunal Superior and in the Ramo Criminal in the 
Archivo General de la Naci6n. For an excellent discussion ofthe Libros de reos, including 
comments on the missing police and court inventories of the AGJ, see Sanchez-Arcilla, 
"La Administraci6n de Justicia inferipr en la Ciudad de Me*xico," 316-332. 
Many historians and nineteenth-century critics of Spanish colonial justice have based 
much of their censure ofthe criminal justice system in Mexico City, particularly its alleged 
abusive, arbitrary, and corrupt nature, on the commentaries ofthe late eighteenth-century 
observer, Hipolito Villarroel, not on a comprehensive and systematic examination of 
the case files. Moreover, a careful reading of Villaroel's criticism of the judicial system 
illustrates that his charges are levied primarily at the operation of the civii, not criminal, 
court procedure and that his denunciation ofthe escribanos has little basis in the case file 
evidence. Mexico por dentro y fuera bajo el gobierno de ks vireyes, o sea enfermedades politkas 
que padece k capital de esta Nueva Espana en casi todo ks cuerpos de que se compone y remedios 
que se k deben apUcar para su curacidn si se quiere que sea Ml dreyyd pubUco (Mexico City, 
1831), 36-40, 46-50. For a discussion of how his accusations shaped later perceptions 
of criminal justice in the Bourbon colonial Mexico City, see Buffington, Criminal and 
Citizen in Modern Mexico, 15-17, 21, 25. Woodrow Borah's brief biographical study of 
Villarroel suggests that his indictment of the colonial legal system should be used with 
considerable caution. "Alguna luz sobre el autor de las Enfermedades poUucas,n EstuaHos de 
Historia Novohispana 8 (1985): 51-79. 
34. I estimated the average caseload by examining the daily arrest patterns in the Libros 
de reos, particularly those maintained by the escribanos ofthe akalde ordinarios and akaldes 
de barrio nos. 21,22 and 23. AGJ, Libros de reos, akalde ordinario mas antiguo, 1800; Libros 
de reos, akalde de barrio numero 21, 1800; Libros de reos, akalde ordinario menos antiguo, 
1807; AJT, Libros de reos, akalde ordinario mas antiguo, 1795; Libros de reos, akalde ordinario 
mas antiguo, 1796; Libros de reos, akalde ordinario mas antiguo, 1798; Ubros de reos, akaldes 
de barrio numeros 22 y 23, 1798. The 1810 report of cases dispatched by the magistrates 
and scribes of the Sata del Crimen reflects similar patterns. AGN, Real Acuerdo, vol. 20, 
exp. 150, f. 28. 
35. Our petitioner Mariano Espinosa, for instance, worked with one of the jueces mayores 
as well as the four ofthe akaldes de barrio in his jurisdiction. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exps. 
3 and 4. 
36. Juicios ordinarios, also referred to as procesos ordinarios, constitute the more formal 
and extensive criminal cases (causas criminaks) the scribe ultimately archived upon their 
completion. The libros de reos comprise an inventory ofthe juicios sumarios or, as they are 
sometimes called, juicios or procesos verbaks. Based on Roman and canon law precedents, 
medieval and subsequent Spanish law authorized juicios sumarios in order to minimize 
expenses and expedite the judicial process, particularly for those minor offenses in which 
the accused confessed or the evidence was more than sufficient for the judge to issue a 
sentence. See the sections in the mid-eighteenth formuiaries on "De proceso criminal abre- 
vktdo" in Garcfa Leon, "Un formulario de causas criminales," 146 and uProceso Criminal 
abrebiado (sic)" in Cutter, libro de ks principaks rudimentos, 57; Francisco Tomas y Va? 
liente, Gobierno e instituciones en k Espana del Antiguo Regimen (Madrid, 1982), 240-244; 
Montero Aroca, La herencia procesal espanok, 65-79; Rodriguez de San Miguel, Pandectas 
Hispano-Megicanas, 1: no. 1789; Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 139-140 and 144-147. 
For the extensive use of summary or abridged hearings in the Juzgado General de Indios and 
other Spanish American colonies, see, respectively, Borah, Justice by Insurance, 13-15 
and Corvalan and Castillo, Derecho Procesal Indiano, 193-194. Handling criminal cases 
in a summary fashion was also a common practice in English and American courts in 
the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Peter King, Crime, Justice, 
and Discretion in Entfand, 1740-1820 (Oxford, 2000); Clive Emsley, Crime and Society 
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in England, 1750-1900, 2nd ed. (London, 1996), 12; Bradley Chapin, Criminal Justice in 
Colonial America, 1606-1660 (Athens, 1983), 28-30. 
37. Contrary to what nineteenth-century penal critics and most historians of the colo? 
nial Mexican judicial system have claimed, summary, that is, abridged, trials did not 
mean arbitrary justice and an abuse of legal guarantees. The magistrates followed stan? 
dard criminal procedures in the juicios sumarios, and they did not presume the guilt of 
the accused. As repeatedly seen in the case files, the preliminary testimony gathered by 
the scribe generally determined the culpability of the defendants as well as the serious- 
ness of the offense. The general pattern was that the judge released the accused in the 
absence of corroborating evidence, or issued his sentence if there was proof of a minor 
transgression. If the scribe's initial judicial inquiry indicated a more serious offense, the 
judge then formed a sumaria, which initiated a more formal criminal investigation called 
ajukio ordinario. 
38. For excellent discussions of the more formal criminal judicial procedure used in 
juicios ordinarios, see Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 105-146, Lozano 
Armendares, La criminaUdad en la ciudad de Mexico, 165-167, and Montero Aroca, La 
herencia procesal espanola, 29-63. 
39. I do not wish to categorize the Ibero-American judicial process as being inherently 
rigid and inflexible. While standard and formulaic to a certain degree, it also exhibited 
a legally authorized flexibility. Law codes and royal legislation afforded magistrates the 
right to abridge the criminal investigation if the accused confessed and, as I later discuss, 
modify the sentence to fit the circumstances of the case. See Cutter, The Legal Culture of 
Northern New Spain, 130-148; Corvalan and Castillo, Derecho Procesal lndiano, 193-194 
and 213-214. 
40. The general patterns I will describe reflect the work routine of all the escribanos, 
although some of the specific quotidian responsibilities depended on the officials they 
served and on the type of viceregal appointment, i.e. royal or habiUtado. For instance, 
the five salaried scribes who assisted the magistrates of the Sala del Crimen, such as 
the receptores and relatores, performed institutional duties for the high criminal court in 
addition to the ones described in the essay. Moreover, it is not possible in the scope of this 
article to discuss all the possible judicial activities undertaken by the different types of 
escribanos or the many dimensions ofthe criminal judicial proceedings, such as the nature 
of court sentences. These and other issues will be addressed in my forthcoming monograph 
on the administration of criminal justice in Mexico City from the mid-eighteenth century 
to the 1830s. 
41. Prisoners tried in the courts of the five jueces mayor es of the Sala del Crimen were 
confined in the royal jail. Prisoners in the city jail fell under the jurisdiction of the two 
alcaldes ordinarios and the corregidor. Escribanos de la cdrcel, one at each jail, maintained 
the Libro de entradas. AGN, Bandos, vol. 3, exp. 28; AGN, Criminal, vol. 116, exp. 2; 
AJT, Penal, vol. 8, exp. 62. 
42. See AGN, Criminal, vol. 715, exp. 11, f. 246 for information concerning the sala 
de declaraciones. Concerning the expeditious way in which testimony should be taken, 
Charles III issued the following instruction to corregidores in 1788: "that within twenty- 
four hours after imprisonment, any prisoner, without exception, shall give his statement 
since it is not just to deprive a free man of his liberty without promptly knowing the 
reason why it was taken away from him." Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas Hispano- 
Megicanas, 3: no. 5138. Case evidence shows that the escribanos routinely recorded the 
initial statement within one day after the arrest. 
43. This daily routine was slightly altered every Thursday and Saturday morning when, in 
preparation for the weekly visits to the royal and city jails, all scribes personally delivered 
status reports ofthe active juicios ordinarios to the oidores, the highest-ranking magistrates 
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ofthe Audiencia, or to the akaldes ordinarios. Eusebio Ventura Belena, Recopilacion sumaria 
de todos ks autos acordados de k Real Audiencia y Sak del Crimen de esta Nueva Espana. 2 
vols. (Mexico City, 1991), 2: no. 9, art. 9, 44-45. 
44. In the interest of expediting justice, the law required scribes to notify the prisoner 
of the sentence no later than one day after the judge pronounced it. Rodriguez de San 
Miguel, Pandectas HispanO'Megicanas, 1: no. 1997. According to the case evidence, this 
was routinely done on same day. For the role of escribanos in the sentencing process, see 
Ibid. no. 1701. 
45. For a listing of these records, see AJT, Penal, vol. 13, exps. 1-4. 
46. See, AJT, Penal, vol. 4, exp. 9 and vol. 10, exp. 5. 
47. The majority of arrests in the eight district tribunals occurred after someone, typically 
a working-class person, filed a charge with an akalde de barrio or a magistrate. In 1798, 
for instance, this meant that Indians, castas, and poor creoles filed over 3,000 criminal 
charges in the lower courts of Mexico City. Arrests based on complaints were higher 
in certain offenses, especially family-related problems, vagrancy, theft, and common- 
law marriage/adultery. Scardaville, "Crime and the Urban Poor," 10-11 and 35. The 
expansion in the number of courts and judicial officials in the early 1780s as well as the 
low cost of summary justice facilitated access to and use of the criminal justice system by 
the urban poor, regardless of their economic situation and ethnicity. The reduction and 
even elimination of court fees for indigents gave people from all social groups access to 
the criminal judicial system. Civil litigation involved significantly greater costs than did 
criminal cases. See notes 62 and 67 for additional comments on criminal and civil court 
expenses. 
48. AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 5 involves a case of a man brandishing a sword at 
the scribe and other judicial officials who were attempting to arrest him. 
49. Clearly, this portrait of a typical day represents an ideal scenario. It does not include 
those days when the escribano was ill or distracted by family or other matters. Nor should we 
assume that all scribes were always and equally diligent in fulfilling their responsibilities. 
However, the case file evidence involving dozens of escribanos over almost a thirty-year 
period consistently reflects a high degree of professional commitment and performance. 
50. AGN, Criminal, vol. 73, exp. 5, fs. 303-303v. The oidores or akaldes ordinarios 
reviewed the status of each major criminal file (juicio ordinario) in the presence of the 
prisoner and the scribe who handled the case to determine whether it snould continue 
or, because of delays, be expedited or terminated. 
51. See, for instance, AJT, Penal, vol. 3, exp. 9 and exp. 51; vol. 8, exp. 49; Archivo 
Historico del Distrito Federal, Mexico City (hereafter AHDF), Policia en General, vol. 
3628, exp. 72. 
52. See, AJT, Penal, vol. 8, exp. 32. In addition to his routine duties, Mariano Espinosa 
served as the scribe in the 326 cases generated during the kvas de vagos conducted in 
1797 and 1798. AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 7. 
53. Pre-constitutional Ibero-american governments, which were shaped largely by me? 
dieval political principles, were not characterized by a separation of executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers. As representatives of the king, who embodied all four dimensions of 
governance, royal officials in varying degrees exercised multiple responsibilities. Judges 
and police officials performed at a minimum judicial (justicia) and administrative (gobierno 
or policia) duties. Some officials, like the corregidores, also discharged fiscal (hacienda) and 
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military (guerra) obligations. For a succinct discussion ofthe relationship between justicia 
and other govemmental functions, see Zorraqufn Becu, Lafuncionde justicia, 17-22 and 
26-30. 
54. For an overview of these activities relating to PoUcia, see AHDF, Alumbrado, vol. 
345, exp. 8; AHDF, Policfa en General, vols. 3628 and 3629. 
55. The royal scribes who assisted the lay magistrates also were known as escribanos de 
numero or escribanos publicos and exercised a monopoly on all notarial duties in the city. 
In addition to their work in civil suits, these escribanos publkos prepared, maintained, 
and archived the specific legal instruments and the Ubros de protocolos that comprise 
today's notary archives in Mexico City. Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas Hispano- 
Megicanas, 2: no. 3610; Fernandez del Castiilo, Historia de la escribania, 55-56; Mijares 
Ramfrez, Escribanos y escrituras pubUcas en el sigfo XVI, 45-47; 56-57; Icaza Dufour, "De 
los escribanos publicos en Nueva Espana," 53, 88-89, 94. See note 21 concerning the 
exclusion of deputy scribes from notarial duties and civil litigation. 
56. Spanish law specified limits on the length of time required for certain judicial pro? 
cedures. One such law in the 1462 Ordenamiento de Alcald, for instance, decreed that 
magistrates must issue the final sentence no longer than twenty days after the investi? 
gation had been completed. Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, 3: 
no. 4108. The case evidence shows that this was routinely done, often long before the 
three-week limit. 
57. The typical escribano was not simply trying to get through the day as quickly as 
possible. After reading many criminal cases, my sense is that the testimonies of witnesses 
and the accused were relatively unstructured affairs in which their length and detail 
varied in accordance with what person needed or wanted to express. Moreover, the scribe's 
charge in the judge's auto cabeza del proceso gave him latitude to decide whether additional 
actions, such as conducting a careo or locating additional witnesses, were necessary to 
resolve any discrepancies in the evidence. Seen in this light, the principal investigative 
charge of the escribanos was to provide, if possible, a file of congruent testimony and 
other evidence to the judge so that he could make an informed deliberation. Again, my 
impression, based on the case evidence, is that the scribes did not compromise the judicial 
actions required of them. 
58. Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, 3: no. 5139. This order 
should not be read as evidence of widespread judicial abuse in Mexico City. Typically the 
origin of such royal decrees is found in complaints that had been submitted by colonial 
officials or subjects from any part of the empire, but the characteristic response of the 
Spanish monarchy was to issue injunctions that were applicable throughout the colonies. 
In this sense, this particular royal decree provided the king an opportunity to reaffirm 
standard and expected judicial practices. 
59. In spite of the legally-sanctioned social inequalities of the era which customarily 
shaped the sentences of the court, the case evidence also shows that the courts system- 
atically extended procedural safeguards to all of the accused, regardless of their class, 
ethnicity, gender, and age. 
60. Many petitions submitted to the magistrates end with the phrase: "es Justicia" an 
assertion suggesting that members of popular groups expected that the legal system would 
be procedurally fair and that justice would be served. Although such court documents 
were drawn up with the assistance ofa scribe to ensure that they followed certain juridical 
forms, they are nonetheless one reflection of the extent to which working class people 
from different backgrounds possessed legal knowledge and expressed legal expectations. 
As the literature on procedural fairness illustrates, notions of justice are based just as 
much on receiving a fair hearing than on obtaining a desired court ruling. See note 6 for 
an elaboration of this point. 
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While historians typically have explained the application of due process as a royal favor 
or as an act of royal benevolence, recent research points to the existence of a concept 
of rights, including the notion of due process, that has roots in twelfth-century canon 
law developments in Western Europe. These studies demonstrate the emergence of a 
juridical-political consensus that all members of society possessed inalienable, individ? 
ual God-given rights, not merely communal or corporate rights. A theory of individual 
rights, which encompassed the principle of a defendant's legal rights, had become widely 
accepted in Western jurisprudence by the end ofthe thirteenth century and subsequently 
was incorporated into Spain's influential legal code, the Siete Partidas. The development 
of a natural rights discourse that preceded the rise of early capitalism and the Enlight? 
enment offers additional insight into why the courts of Bourbon Mexico City, even in 
the absence of specific constitutional requirements, strictly adhered to procedural norms 
for individuals from even the lowest, and the most feared, social classes. According to 
medieval jurists and restated time and again in more secularized forms in succeeding 
centuries, the king and his agents could not withhold such rights since they were bound 
by a higher, natural law. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural 
Rights, NaturalLawandChurchLaw, 1150-1625 (Atianta, 1997); Annabel S. Brett, Db- 
erty, Right, and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Schokstic Thought (Cambridge, 1997); 
Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the 
Western Legal Tradition (Berkeley, 1993); Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 81-97; Jorge M. 
Ayala, "Antecedentes medievales de los derechos humanos," Veritas: Revista de Fiksofk 
44 (1999): 853-864; Mackay, The Umits of Royal Authority, 173-177. 
61. For a discussion of how legal protections contribute to regime legitimization, see Lind 
and Tyier, The Social Psychokgy ofProceduralJustice; Jacob, "Introduction," in Courts, Law, 
and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 13-14. 
62. Other court practices reflective of the late colonial legal culture also contributed 
to notions of fairness and effectiveness, such as speed of justice, cost, and final court 
sentences. The judges waived certain kinds of judicial expenses for indigents and, as 
previously noted, handled the vast majority of cases expeditiously. The magistrates' sen? 
tences in juicios sumarios generally were temperate, with the courts acquitting or placing 
on probation nearly one-quarter of all of the accused. Fines, which accounted for 29 per? 
cent of the sentences in summary cases, were the most frequently used judicial penalty. 
Ofthe thousands of cases analyzed, there were no incidences of capital punishment, and 
corporal punishment was rarely used by the first decade of the nineteenth century. For 
extended discussions ofthe generally moderate court sentences in both the juicios ordinar? 
ios and juicios sumarios, see Scardaville, "Crime and the Urban Poor," 276-308; Lozano 
Armendares, La criminalidad en k ciudad de Mexico, 169-180; and Sanchez-Arcilla, "La 
Administracidn de Justicia inferior en la Ciudad de Mexico," 357 and 447-448. 
63. For the authorized escribano fee structure (arancel) in criminal cases, see AGN, 
Bandos, vol. 3 exp. 27. 
64. Ibero-American law authorized this abbreviation of the formal judicial process. As 
specified in the Skte Partidas, the pknario was necessary only if the sumaria or probatory 
phase did not conclusively demonstrate the culpability ofthe accused or, in complex cases, 
fully document the nature of the criminal offense. Montero Aroca, La herencia procesal 
espafiok, 39; Corvalah and Castillo, Derecho Procesal Indiano, 213-214. Moreover, case 
file evidence demonstrates that the municipal judges customarily terminated the process 
upon the completion of the investigative phase if charges against the accused were not 
substantiated. In Mexico City, iewjuicio ordinarios went the full procedural distance. 
65. AGN, Bandos, vol. 3, exp. 27. 
66. Recopikcion de kyes de ks reynos de las Indias, Libro II, titulo 23, leyes, 48 and 52. 
For the purpose of fee waivers, Spanish law defined indigence as not possessing any 
property, a condition many working-class people were able to satisfy. Rodriguez de San 
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Miguel, Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, 1: no. 2009. Also see, Ibid., 3: no. 4189; Lozano 
Armendares, La criminaUdad en la ciudad de Mexico, 168-169. 
67. As discussed in note 33, VillarroePs late eighteenth-century criticism of extortion 
generally related to civil, not criminal, cases. Also see Rodriguez de San Miguel's comment 
that scrifees in post-independence Mexico City, in spite of sixteenth-century legislation to 
the contrary, tended to postpone taking action in civil suits involving poor people in favor 
of those filed by wealthier litigants who could more easily afford the necessary judicial fees 
and unsanctioned gratuities. Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, I, no. 1685. Richard L. Kagan's 
study of the civil law process in Hapsburg Spain presents an excellent discussion of the 
widespread corruption and excessive delays that characterized the handling of lawsuits in 
the Castilian judicial system. Lawsuits and Litigants in CastiU, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill, 
1981), 37-51. 
68. In one 1804 case, the Sala del Crimen removed scribe Francisco Santaella from office 
after the court substantiated an accusation that he took a gratificacion (unauthorized fee) 
in an case involving common-law marriage. The Ministers of the high criminal court 
rejected his petition to be reinstated. In this particular instance, the couple involved 
possessed the financial means to offer a substantial bribe. AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 5. 
The alcaldes del crimen removed scribes from office on other occasions after investigations 
corroborated the charges of "abuses" or "excesses." While some escribanos did indeed 
betray their positions of trust, we also must recognize that the Sala del Crimen, in spite 
of the shortage of escribanos, took decisive action once charges were filed and verified. 
Protecting anyone who accused a judicial official of misconduct was the anonymity he or 
she maintained during the probatory or sumaria phase of the investigation. See, AGN, 
Ayuntamientos, vol. 222, exp. 2 and AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exp. 4, no folios. 
69. According to the Rector of the Real CoUgio de Escribanos, the deputy scribes often 
performed fee-based notarial transactions, lucrative judicial behavior that was contrary 
to royal legislation and the 1782 enabling ordinance that limited their responsibilities to 
criminal jurisdiction. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exp. 3, no folios. 
70. See, for instance, AGN, Criminal, vol. 89, exp. 1 
71. For a sampling of such examples, see AGN, Criminal vol. 89, exp. 9; vol. 715, exp. 
2; AJT, Penal, vol. 3, exp. 65; vol. 6, exp. 29. 
7 2. One dimension of the sumaria illustrates this point. As st ipulated by law, the accused 
did not have a right to review the other testimonies gathered in the course ofthe scribe's 
preliminary investigation, although the defendant would be informed of the reason for 
his or her imprisonment. Knowledge of these statements and their contents would occur 
if the case is advanced to the next phase of the process, the pUnario, when a series of 
judicial proofs would be offered to all parties. It should be kept in mind that the secrecy of 
the probatory phase, as is the case for grand jury investigations in common law traditions, 
was not an illegal abuse on the part ofthe authorities. Such judicial behavior was standard 
practice since the Siete Partidas codified penal procedure and was inherent in the nature 
of continental civil law judicial administration. Corvaldn and Castillo, Derecho Procesal 
lndiano, 212; Tomas y Valiente, Gobierno e instituciones en la Espana, 229. Michel Foucault 
discusses the ways in which the secretive nature ofthe preliminary investigation in French 
criminal procedure ofthe ancien regime represents another "technology of power" the state 
used to control and subjugate people charged with a crime. Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
ofthe Prison (New York, 1995), 35-42. 
73. Testifying under oath, especially in the confines of the sala de declaraciones in the 
jail, certainly represented an inequality in power relations between the escribano and the 
accused, but unlike the taking of statements in eighteenth-century French jails, prisoners 
in Mexico City were not made to sit or kneel on uncomfortable chairs or stools (sellettes), 
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and the municipal courts in the viceregai capital, unlike those of pre-Revolutionary Paris, 
did not employ torture as a means of extracting confessions or statements. Richard Mowery 
Andrews, Law, Magistracy and Crime in Old Regime Paris, 1735-1789. Vol. 1: The Criminal 
Justice System (Cambridge, 1994), 429,441-466; Antoinette Wills, Crime and Punishment 
in Revolutionary Paris (Westport, Conn., 1981), 6-9. Andrews does note, however, that 
the incidence of investigative torture was declining in the late eighteenth century, 454. 
The application of torture was permissible under Spanish law until prohibited by the 
Constitution of 1812, and therefore would have been dutifully recorded in the criminal 
files as were all judicial actions, but I did not find one instance of its use in over 7,000 
cases. For supporting evidence, see Lozano Armendares, La criminalidad en k ciudad de 
Mexico, 185 and Sanchez-Arcilla, "La Administracion de Justicia inferior en la Ciudad 
de Mexico," 371-453. 
74. For the historical and juridical basis of arbitrio judicial, see Tomas y Valiente, El 
derecho penal de k monarquia absoluta, 295-317, 320, 331-352, 375-380; Corvaldn and 
Castillo, Derecho Procesal Indiano, 156, 177-184, 193-231; Brundage, Medieval Canon 
Law, 151-156. The fundamental principles of this judicial doctrine are expressed in 
Partida VII of the Siete Partidas. For a discussion of the practice of arbitrio judicial in 
Mexico City and provincial New Spain, see Sanchez-Arcilla, "La Administraci6n de 
Justicia inferior en la Ciudad de M6xico," 371-453; Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern 
New Spain, 35-43; Gonzalez and Lozano, "La administracion de justicia," 101-102; Mario 
A. Tellez Gonzalez, La justicia criminal en el VaUe de Toluca, 1800-1829 (Zinacantepec, 
2001), 177-186. 
75. For a discussion of these criticisms of arbitrio judicial, see Buffington, Criminal and Cit? 
izen in Modern Mexico, 12-21 and 111-119, Tellez Gonzalez, La justicia criminal en el VaUe 
de Toluca, 177-178, and Fabio Lopez-Lazaro, "No Deceit Safe in Its Hiding Place: The 
Criminal Trail in Eighteenth-Century Spain," Law and History Review 20 (2002), 449- 
478. Sanchez-Arciila notes that the eminent Spanish legal historian Francisco Tomas 
y Valiente also erroneously conflated arbitrio judicial with magisterial arbitrariness. "La 
Administraci6n de Justicia inferior en la Ciudad de Mexico," 363-367 and 450-451. 
Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal de k monarquia absoluta, 376-389. 
76. The perfunctory effort to eliminate the "excesses" associated with the pulque (pui- 
querias) and hard liquor taverns (vinaterias) is a typical example of the way in which 
Mexico City's judicial officials modified laws and penalties. Generally, the local magis? 
trates and police officials passively enforced government sanctions on drinking taverns, 
and for those working class people who were arrested for such violations, the judges often 
reduced the penalty stipulated in the laws. Michael C. Scardaville, "Alcohol Abuse and 
Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City," Hispanic American Historical Review 60 
(1980): 643-671. 
77. The periodic conscriptions of alleged vagrants (levas de vagos) during the late 1790s 
were an exception, however. Because of the need to quickly replenish vacant military 
positions during wartime, one of the ministers of the Sak del Crimen, as mandated by 
the Ordenanzas de Levas, streamlined normal criminal procedures. Although evidence 
collected by the escribano was still required to substantiate the charge of vagrancy, there 
were occasions when the royal prosecuting attorney (fiscal), as a form of plea-bargaining, 
encouraged the accused to confess in order to reduce his sentence. See, for example, 
AGN, Criminal, vol. 715, exp. 16. 
78. For British historians, the ceremonial nature of eighteenth-century English criminal 
courts, as public symbols of sovereign authority, conveys the power ofthe state. According 
to E.P. Thompson, for instance, the "hegemony of the eighteenth-century gentry and 
aristocracy was expressed, above all, not in military force, not in the mystincations of a 
priesthood or ofthe press, not even in economic coercion, but in the rituals ofthe study 
of the Justices of the Peace, in the quarter-sessions, in the pomp of the Assizes and in the 
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theatre of Tyburn." Whigs and Hunters: The Origin ofthe Black Act (New York, 1976), 262. 
For similar comments about the "majesty of law," see Dougias Hay, "Property, Authority 
and the Criminal Law", in Dougias Hay, Peter Linebaugh. John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson, 
and Cal Winslow, eds., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century Engjand 
(New York, 1975), 120. North American scholars also have underscored the connection 
between the ceremonial nature of American courts and maintenance of social order. See 
Jacob, "Introduction," in Courts, Law, and PoUtics in Comparative Perspective, 12. 
79. Historians are generally mistaken about the public nature of the criminal judicial 
process in Bourbon Mexico. Contrary to what has been asserted by scholars of crime 
in eighteenth-century New Spain, public trials and courthouses were not part of the 
colonial Mexican legal system. For instance, see Haslip-Viera, Crime and Punishment in 
Late Colonial Mexico City, 81. 
80. The only opportunity for a magistrate to encounter prisoners under his jurisdiction 
was during his weekly inspections ofthe jail, but, as previously noted, the majority ofthe 
accused were sentenced and released in less than a week. 
81. Civil cases also were handled bureaucratically through the submission of written 
documents by the litigants. Corvalan and Castillo, Derecho Procesal lndiano, 83. 
82. By "assured," I do not mean that respect for state authority was unchanging and 
guaranteed. As becomes patently evident in Mexico during the post-1810 independence 
era and following decades, public authority is always dependent on current developments 
and consequently is in a constant state of interpretation and negotiation. 
83. The literature on procedural justice has demonstrated a strong positive connection 
in Western and non-western societies between the nature of the judicial process and 
opinions about and acceptance of political and legal institutions. Lind and Tyler con- 
clude that "judgements of process fairness were consistently the major factor involved 
in generalizations from personal experience to system-level views." Although they use 
terms like procedural justice and procedural fairness interchangeably, they "do not mean 
to imply that cultures that lack concepts easily translatable as 'fairness' lack procedural 
effect. We believe that whether violation of an entitlement is labeled 'unfair' or 'inap- 
propriate' or 'impolite,' the psychological consequences are much the same." The Social 
Psychobgy of Procedural Justice, 3, 76-81, 129-145, 203-220. 
84. He earned a 200-peso salary for his position as relator (official who prepares legal 
briefs), a post that required scribe certification even though Espinosa was still classified 
as an escribano habiUtado. He paid a price for the financial stability the position afforded. 
In addition to his extensive institutional responsibilities, he also served as scribe to one 
of the jueces mayores and to all four alcaldes de barrio in one of the major administrative 
districts. The magistrate, Manuel Mariano de Blaya, who was a jurist by training, gave 
Espinosa high marks for his professional conduct and knowledge. Espinosa continued to 
work as a deputy scribe in different judicial capacities in the Sala del Crimen until 1820. 
AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 5; AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exp. 3; Arnold, Directorio de 
burocratas en la ciudad de Mexico, 39. 
85. Other tribunals in Mexico City, such as the Alumbrado, the Inquisition, the Indios, 
and the Acordada, also behaved in a similar fashion. For case examples, see AJT, Libros de 
reos, corregidor, 1794, 1796, 1798; AGN, Criminal, vol. 84, exp. 11; vol. 641, exps. 6 and 
7. Also see Borah, Justice by Insurance, 232-233; William F. Connell, "Transformation 
of a Criminal Court in Mexico City: An Inquiry into the Real Tribunal de la Acordada, 
1775-1812." M.A. thesis (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1997). As noted 
previously, this moderate use of judicial power in the late colonial period also is evident 
in the generally temperate sentences handed down by all courts. 
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86. We should be sensitive to the fact that popular rejection of specific laws and gov? 
ernment initiatives, which some ofthe urban poor viewed as inimical to their beliefs and 
customs, did not invalidate a general acceptance of legal institutions. 
87. My research on law enforcement suggests a more reactive urban constabulary than 
has often been portrayed, a conclusion based in large part on detailed examination of 
daily police practices. I do not find considerable evidence in the use of force and coercion 
in the every day behavior ofthe akaldes de barrio, guardafaroleros (street lighting guards), 
and other judicial agents in Mexico City. 
88. I again stress the need to historicize our understanding of the legal system in par? 
ticular and the colonial state in general. In attempting to examine the criminal justice 
system, scholars must be wary of broad generalizations in terms of time and place as a 
result of differing institutional, economic, and, demographic conditions. My study applies 
specifically to late colonial Mexico City, but I ultimately hope to raise issues and processes 
that can be explored in different contexts. 
With this said, I should note as a preliminary point of comparison that courts in 
some parts of rural New Spain, including those in the frontier provinces ofNew Mexico 
and Texas, and in the Spanish colonies of Chile, Rio de la Plata, and Ecuador, display 
a remarkable adherence to procedural norms in spite of the absence of trained jurists 
and scribes. Perhaps these procedural similarities in vastly different and far-flung parts 
of the Spanish American empire suggest a fairly broad understanding and acceptance of 
Iberian legal norms throughout the colonies. This tentative conclusion clearly has to be 
substantiated by more extensive examination of local court records in many parts ofNew 
Spain and other regions of the Americas. Gonzalez and Lozano, "La administracion de 
justicia," 88-105; Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain; Corvalan and Castillo, 
Derecho Procesal Indiano, 42, 406-417; Zorraquin Becu, La funcion de justicia, 24; Tamar 
Herzog, La administracion como un fenomino social: k justicia penal de k ciudad de Quito 
(1650-1750) (Madrid, 1995), especially chapter 8. 
Moreover, in a forthcoming article on this enduring colonial legal culture in the early 
national period, I note that the introduction of modern constitutional forms of govern? 
ment in the early nineteenth century did not alter basic colonial juridical principles. "Los 
procesos judiciales y la autoridad del Estado: reflexiones en torno a la administracion de la 
justicia criminal y la legitimidad en la ciudad de Mexico, desde fines de la Colonia hasta 
principios del Mexico independiente," in Brian Connaughton, ed., Poder y Legitimidad en 
Mexico, Siglo XIX. Instituciones y Cultura Politica (Mexico City, forthcoming). 
89. Tomas y Valiente and Alonso Romero discuss the continuity of medieval and Haps? 
burg legal principles under the Bourbons. El derecho penal de k monarquia absoluta, 93-112, 
380, 407-408 and El proceso penal en Castilk, 317-335. 
90. One of the best examples of the numerous late eighteenth-century legal reform 
initiatives was the successful effort to eliminate the arbitrary procedural practices of the 
Tribunal ofthe Acordada, a judicial institution created earlier in the century to deal swiftly 
and, if necessary, severely with rural crime and banditry. MacLachlan, Criminal Justice in 
Eighteenth Century Mexico, 71-74 and 84-87; Connell, "Transformation of a Criminal 
Court in Mexico City." For the procedures the Acordada magistrates and escribanos were 
required to follow after 1776, see, AGN, Acordada, vol. 9, fs. 180-195. 
91. This understanding of what I call the "judicial state", and especially the operation 
of the criminal justice system, is very much at odds with historians of crime in colonial 
Mexico City who envision law as being largely coercive. They focus more on how the 
state sustains domination by force, or threat to use force, than on how authority can 
be created though cultural meanings. Legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, in her 
critique of this one-dimensional view of law, explores the multi-faceted manner in which 
law can establish support for authority. As she notes, "law exerts both coercive power and 
subtle cultural domination." Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among 
Working<kss Americans (Chicago, 1990), 8-11. 
